These protections take shape in two ways . Supreme Court explained that in New York, a search warrant must list "each specific area of the building, area or vehicle to be searched" and "[p]robable cause must be shown in each instance." Supreme Court granted suppression, on constraint of People v Sciacca (45 NY2d 122 [1978]), and the Appellate Division affirmed on the determinative ground that the "search warrant did not particularize that a search of the vehicles was permitted" (169 AD3d 714, 714-715 [2d Dept 2019]). Moreover, every other state high court that has addressed this issue has, like the federal courts, held that a warrant authorizing a search of the entire premises permits the police to search vehicles located thereon [FN5]. March 20, 2019. In one of first impression for the Georgia Supreme Court, the issue this case presented centered on the effect of the States delay in obtaining search warrants for data contained in electronic devices when those devices were originally seized in a warrantless, but lawful, manner by police. Judge Feinman dissents in an opinion in which Chief Judge DiFiore and Judge Garcia concur. Indeed, the cases cited by defendant predate the "dawn of active New York State constitutionalism" in the 1980s, before which the "state constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures mostly lay judicially dormant" (Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals' Quest for Principled Decisionmaking, 62 Brook L Rev 1, 103, 213 [1996]). Siegal represents John Drago who owned and operated a check cashing business, Kayla Companies. The deponent set forth his experience, stating that he had been involved in more than 1,000 drug-related arrests, that he was familiar with the modus operandi of heroin dealers, that the activity taking place at the premises was consistent with narcotics transactions, and, based on the above, there was probable cause to believe drugs would be "found at the above described premises." The Nissan, which was registered to Mr. Gordon's cousin, was parked in the driveway of the residence. I see no persuasive rationale why, if a bicycle and a car are parked next to each other on a driveway, it is reasonable to search the bicycle's closed basket but unreasonable to search the car's trunk. This not only underscores that the corresponding state and federal constitutional provisions reach the same result, but also demonstrates that, traditionally, the Court "follow[ed] a policy of uniformity with the federal courts" when considering search-and-[*9]seizure arguments (Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 St. John's L Rev 399, 417 [1987]; see e.g. To the extent that the dictum in Sciacca was referring to a scenario where a search warrant only describes a particular structure, it has no application where, as here, instead of limiting the search to a specific structure, the search warrant authorizes a search of the "entire premises," which, as particularized in this case, included the house as well as surrounding private property. Those cases rested on both the New York and U.S. Constitutions as well as the Criminal Procedure Law to require a greater degree of protection for searches of vehicles than is now required under the federal circuit court law cited by the People. Here, by contrast, the question is whether the officers exceeded the scope of a valid search warrant for evidence of an illicit drug business conducted from the premisesan issue not addressed by this Court in Hansen. As explained below, the constitutional principles we have developed in this area, including judicial monitoring of the search warrant process and the importance of probable cause and particularity, strongly weigh against the People's proposed rule. Disclaimer: Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. Get free summaries of new New York Court of Appeals opinions delivered to your inbox! Citing Hansen and Dumper, we stated: "It is clear that a warrant to search a building does not include authority to search vehicles at the premises (People v Hansen, 38 NY2d 17; People v Dumper, 28 NY2d 296). The Constitution (NY Const, art I, 12; US Const, 4th Amdt) requires that a warrant particularly describe the place to be searched and the Criminal Procedure Law provides for the issuance of warrants to search persons, premises or vehicles (CPL 690.15). . 238453. . Instead of attempting to ameliorate the concern by, as other courts have done, fashioning an appropriate rule (see n 1, supra), the majority categorically prohibits the search of vehicles pursuant to a premises warrant unless the vehicles are identified in the warrant application and supported by a separate showing of probable cause, making vehicles concealed on premises effectively search proof. During each alleged sale, a driver pulled up in front of the premises in their vehicle, and defendant exited his residence, approached the vehicle, and then returned to the house. You're all set! In the context of Article 1, Section 12, we have done so when, among other considerations, "the aims of predictability and precision in judicial review of search and seizure cases . at 127). provided an affidavit to an Eastern District of NYmagistrate judge to request a search of Kayla. . Federal courts, applying Ross, have found that vehicles located in the area to be searched are a type of containerworthy of no more protection than other types of containers (see e.g. The majority disagrees with every federal court and state high court, and posits that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the search of the vehicles here (majority op at 20). . G.R. Disclaimer: Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. Judges Rivera, Stein and Fahey concur. Bias May be Implicit in Current Law on Search and Seizure Friday, March 1st, 2019 Beth Karp 48 latin woman opening the front door, white inside Over the past several years, questions about racial bias in law enforcement have commanded a great deal of public attention. at 822 [emphasis added]). Video, Inc., 68 NY2d 296, 305-306 [1986]). We are not convinced that constitutional protections turn on such accidents of timing; an automobile not mentioned in a premises search warrant, whether arriving one minute before or one minute after the search commences, should be entitled to the same protection under our constitution. Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own. People v Garvin, 30 NY3d 174, 185 n 8 [2017] ["Any issues regarding whether New York Constitution, article I, 12 provides greater protection . When the People invoked Ross in their response papers, defendant ignored the argument.[FN8]. are best promoted by applying State constitutional standards" (Johnson, 66 NY2d at 407) and when the "constitutional protections we have enjoyed in this State . A search and seizure is not valid unless it is based on either a warrant that was issued based on probable cause that a crime had been committed or upon an exception. Prosecutors did not provide a date for when Drago should expect that indictment. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously Monday against warrantless searches by police and seizures in the home in a case brought by a man whose guns officers confiscated after a domestic. Posey was arrested after the Officer responded to a look out for Robbery suspects. Recent Case : 926 F.3d 369 (7th Cir. Here, no vehicle was designated or described in the warrant, and the People have not argued that the police had probable cause to engage in a search of anything outside of what was designated or described in the warrant. . In Ross, the Supreme Court held that when police officers have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the trunk of a vehiclebased on an informant's tip that narcotics were being kept in the trunk of the carthe police may open a paper bag found inside the trunk (Ross, 456 US at 801). As a repeat offender, a Passaic County judge sentenced him to consecutive prison terms totaling 25 years, and at. In another case of illegal search and seizure, three Chicago police officers and one Glenview police officer who were involved in an illegal search and seizure of a man's car were deemed guilty of perjury, obstructing justice, and official misconduct earlier this year when it was found that they had illegally searched the defendant's . No such connections were made here. Indeed, we observed in Dumper thatpursuant to both constitutional and statutory directivesa "warrant must describe the premises to be searched" and "this warrant did not include the automobile" (Dumper, 28 NY2d at 299). Siegal. Nevertheless, this concern exists. Indeed, a parallel citation indicates a belief by the litigant (or the court) that the state and federal provisions at issue are coextensive. We then concluded that even if the affidavit had been sufficient to support a search of the residence, the warrant failed "in any event [to] justify a search of the automobile which had just been driven into the driveway" (id. The People rely heavily on United States v Ross (456 US 798 [1982]) and several decisions of Federal Courts of Appeals that have determined, under the U.S. Constitution, that a warrant to search an "entire premises" may, under certain circumstances, impliedly authorize a search of automobiles found on the property (e.g. Even were we to put aside the contrary reasoning of Hansen and Dumper, the dissent never addresses the fundamental tenets of our search warrant jurisprudence: it is the magistrate, and not the police officer, who determines the scope of the search conducted pursuant to a warrant (Hanlon, 36 NY2d at 559; P.J. Collins v. Virginia Nevertheless, in our view, that does not render our repeated citations to the State Constitution meaningless. at 20-21). The defendant controverted the warrant, arguing that it was "constitutionally deficient for not 'particularly describing the place to be searched'" (Rainey, 14 NY2d at 36, citing NY Const, art I, 12; US Const, 4th Amend]). recent illegal search and seizure cases 2022 recent illegal search and seizure cases 2022. Shield to look into the matter. Before Supreme Court, Mr. Gordon cited the same New York caselaw discussed above to argue that New York law has "consistently adhered to the position that a search warrant must specify the area to be searched." . In Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005), this Court held that a dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable seizures. Video, 68 NY2d at 307 [noting that Hanlon "imposed a specific, nondelegable burden on the magistrate which required that (the magistrate), not the police, determine probable cause"]). Siegal, one of the top white collar attorneys in the country and a former federal prosecutor, has uncovered yet another 4th Amendment violation, this one in the Eastern District of New York. Mr. Gordon was arrested and arraigned on a 9-count indictment. Defendant sought to suppress all evidence seized from the Nissan and Chevrolet. Because the supporting affidavits did not describe the vehicles to be searched at all, never mind with any particular allegations connecting them to criminal activity, the record supports the affirmed finding that there was no probable cause to search the vehicles. . In an omnibus motion, Mr. Gordon moved to suppress that evidence. To address the continued viability of caselaw premised upon our interpretation of both the U.S. and the State Constitutions, we now clarify thatat the very leastthose cases accurately set forth our state constitutional law. In that case, police saw drugs in the home when they were investigating a burglary and later obtained a warrant for the home and the van (id. The particularity requirement protects the magistrate's determination regarding the permissible scope of the search. Rainey established that probable cause to search a suspect's residence did not encompass the authority to search a separate residence, even if both were located on the same premises. While the majority characterizes these cases as setting forth state constitutional lawsimply by retroactively decreeing them to do so (majority op at 19)it is not clear if the majority intends these cases to stand for our contrary interpretation of the Federal Constitution, to form some kind of common-law rule, to be an implied application of the Criminal Procedure Law, or to express a heightened state constitutional standard. To satisfy the constitutional requirement for particularity, the description setting forth the search must "leave no discretion to the executing officer[s]" (Brown, 96 NY2d at 84). at 402 [the "ultimate mandate of reasonableness" "depend(s) upon the facts and circumstances"]). For example, "a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found" (Ross, 456 US at 821). Here, based on the uncontroverted probable cause to believe that defendant was engaged in drug trafficking on and around the premises of his residence, the warrant directed to the "entire premises" was sufficiently particular to "enable the searcher to identify the persons, places or things that [a court] has previously determined should be searched or seized" (see People v Nieves, 36 NY2d 396, 401 [1975]). The significance of that conclusion relates back to the basic standards for issuing and reviewing search warrants (see Nieves, 36 NY2d at 402 [ "In reviewing the validity of a search warrant . This jurisdictional rule is grounded in the principle of federalism (see Long, 463 US at 1041, quoting Minnesota v National Tea Co., 309 US 551, 557 [1940] ["'It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. Prosecutors initially argued that the failure of listing an actual crime in the warrant was a typographical error. Nearly 30 years ago, an Appellate Division court applied Ross to reach the same conclusion (see People v Powers, 173 AD2d 886, 888-889 [3d Dept 1991] [interpreting Ross to permit the search of a vehicle owned or controlled by the owner of the premises authorized to be searched by the warrant], lv denied 78 NY2d 1079 [1991]). A Judge of this Court granted the People's motion for leave to appeal (33 NY3d 976 [2019]), and we now affirm. Worse still, the majority's preservation rule will have the effect of transforming those same cases, and any other cases that employ parallel citations to the State and Federal Constitutions, into seminal state constitutional decisions, irrespective of the fact that those cases are wholly devoid of any basis for concluding that the New York Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in the context of the issues they addressed. Before Supreme Court, the People responded by attempting to distinguish our prior decisions and arguing that, if they were distinguishable and therefore not controlling, Supreme Court should adopt the People's preferred rule interpreting the Fourth Amendment. Because the search warrant in this case contained no references to the vehicles and the record supports the finding of Supreme Court that the search warrant materials failed to provide probable cause to search the vehicles, the evidence seized therefrom was properly suppressed. Two subsequent cases did. You can explore additional available newsletters here. Yet that statement represents our Court's understanding of the meaning of our prior decisions in Hansen and Dumper, one that, as we noted in Sciacca, accords with the legislature's prescription of "what and who" are subject to search pursuant to a New York warrant (see CPL 690.15 [1] ["A search warrant must direct a search of one or more of the following: (a) A designated or described place or premises; (b) A designated or described vehicle . Citing Rainey, we [*3]reiterated that under our precedent, the "scope of the search has been carefully limited" and "probable cause must be shown in each instance" (id.). upon the magistrate determining probable cause"]). Shield ruled on September 10 that the items seized from Drago's business shouldbe suppressed and that the agents' reliance on a warrant without aspecification of a crime was one of "recklessness.". However, we held that the police lacked sufficient evidence to search a vehicle that had been seen coming and going from the residence. The majority says that "automobiles, unlike other containers, are typically titled and registered," "more often in public view," and used for traveling "to visit other places and people" (majority op at 15). Our prior decisional law and the CPL's differentiation between premises, vehicles, and persons both support the view that specific descriptions or designations, backed by particularized probable cause, are required for a search of each. In fact, Cady expressly con-trasted its treatment of a vehicle already under police con-trol with a search of a car "parked adjacent to the dwelling Our Court has never adopted a "fixed analytical formula for determining when the proper protection of fundamental rights requires resort to the State Constitution" (Scott, 79 NY2d at 491). Bumphus's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when the police seized his car and then delayed several days without any legitimate explanation, however small before searching the vehicle, and that The suppression of the gun recovered in the eventual search was warranted. D E C I S I O N. LEONEN, J.: To be valid, searches must proceed from a warrant issued by a judge.1 While there are exceptions to this rule, warrantless searches can only be carried out when founded on probable cause . Washington CNN The Supreme Court on Monday wiped away a lower court decision that held that law enforcement could enter a Rhode Island man's home and seize his firearms without a warrant. We cannot accept the argument that the entry into the private garage was a permissible incident of the right to search pursuant to a warrant. Those expectations must at times give way to "compelling police interest[s]" (People v Class, 63 NY2d 491, 495 [1984], revd and remanded by New York v Class, 475 US 106 [1986], reaffirmed on state constitutional grounds by People v Class, 67 NY2d 431 [1986]). Both conclusions fundamentally alter our jurisprudence. The reason the warrant did not describe the vehicles in this case, as in Dumper, is that the warrant application materials failed to mention the vehicles, which consequently fell beyond the scope of the warrant. The majority seems primarily concerned about the possibility that vehicles parked on a target's premises might belong to a visiting friend or acquaintance (majority op at 15, 16 n 2)a possibility I view as quite remote where, for example, the vehicle is found in an enclosed structure (such as a garage), in a backyard, or behind a gate, or when no visiting friend or acquaintance is in fact present at the premises. Reviewing the warrant materials, Supreme Court concluded that probable cause was lacking in this case because the detective's affidavit made no mention of the vehicles or otherwise "provide[d] any specific probable cause [to believe] that the vehicles were involved in the criminal activity." Las autoridades investigan el hallazgo de documentos clasificados en un despacho que ocup Biden tras dejar la vicepresidencia. at 21 [emphasis added]). "Listen to this mother, who lost two children to fentanyl poisoning, tell the truth about . We agreed, and held that "[f]or purposes of satisfying the State and Federal constitutional requirements, the searching of two or of more residential apartments in the same building is no different from searching two or more separate residential houses. The legislature's instruction that a warrant may direct a search of "one or more of the following" strongly suggests that a warrant which directs the search of only one category (e.g. at 825; see People v Langen, 60 NY2d 170, 180-181 [1983] [applying Ross and declining to adopt a different rule under the New York State Constitution]). at 128). This applies when a person has what is known as a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or thing to be searched. This case presents the question whether the Fourth Amendment tolerates a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traffic stop. The warrant was issued on August 28, 2015 and executed one week later. Those limits have not been honored in this case. The Court broadly stated that a "lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search" (Ross, 456 US at 820-821). Probable cause must be shown in each instance" (id. . at 299). It was not immediately clear under what circumstances the lawyer, M. Evan Corcoran, appeared, but he has had a key role in the case examining Mr. Trumps handling of government documents. One should hope not. Discipline in this area benefits not only the Supreme Court in determining its own jurisdiction, but also this Court in establishing a respected body of state constitutional law. Section 690.15 (1) of the CPL states: "1. It's a fact that check cashing businesses handle a lot of cash and with a lot of cash comes a lot of reporting. 211214. it is no less fixed than a suitcase or handbag found on the premises, both of which can readily be searched under Ross if capable of containing the object of the search"]). We have on several occasions addressed the permissible scope of a search based on allegations of illegal activity occurring at a residence or premises (see e.g. During execution of the warrant, the police searched two vehicles: (1) a Nissan Maxima parked on the driveway of the property and (2) an unregistered 2000 Chevrolet sedan parked in the backyard. The People opposed, arguing that the search warrant was not restricted to the private dwelling, but authorized the search of the "entire premises," which includes the house located at the address as well as the surrounding curtilage, and that the search of the vehicles parked thereon was reasonable as they could and did contain contraband sought by the warrant. It is the majority's treatment of the state constitutional issue that is most problematic. In Sciacca, our statement that "a warrant to search a building does not include authority to search vehicles at the premises" was arguably dicta because the facts there involved whether a search warrant for a vehicle authorized an intrusion into a premises, and not vice versa. The requirement that warrants must describe with particularity the places, vehicles, and persons to be searched is vital to judicial supervision of the warrant process (see People v P.J. 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